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1 
Political Realism and Dirty Hands: Value Pluralism, Moral Conflict, and Public Ethics 
  
The realist complaint that contemporary political philosophy is detached from political reality is well-worn. 
Yet, whilst the general contours of the realist charge against what is termed ‘political moralism’ (Williams, 
2002), ‘the ethics first’ or ‘applied ethics’ approach (Geuss, 2008; Sleat & Rossi, 2014), appear to be well 
understood, there exists confusion about what, exactly, is distinctive of realist thought (Galston, 2010; Horton, 
2010; Sabl & Sagar, 2017). This much, Matt Sleat (2014) and Ed Hall (2015) suggest, is apparent in moralist 
accounts which elide realism with the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. But such confusion is also perpetuated by 
realists themselves who conflate realism with philosophical positions which are highly moralistic. 
 
This paper seeks to explore a neglected manifestation of this tendency and, in so doing, to go some way toward 
untangling the aforementioned problems. Specifically, it draws on the underappreciated realist thought of 
Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Judith Shklar1, rehearses their critique of moralism and extends it to a 
position which seems far from obvious a target: the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis, mostly owed to Michael 
Walzer2, which a number of contemporary realists, such as Mark Philp (2007), Duncan Bell (2010), and Hans-
Jörg Sigwart (2013), have appealed to in their endeavour to challenge moralism and/or tackle the insufficiently 
addressed question of what a more affirmative, realist public ethic might involve. In illustrating that the DH 
thesis is a disguised brand of moralism, I shall not merely put some flesh on the bones of Shklar’s scattered, 
unsystematic objections to Walzer’s thought – the only realist who explicitly criticized his DH thesis. Rather, 
I hope to illustrate that Berlin’s, Hampshire’s and Shklar’s neglected insights shed new light on what is peculiar 
to the realist critique of moralism, the conception of value pluralism which animates that critique, and on what 
a distinctly realist approach to public ethics and integrity might entail3. Specifically, I shall suggest that the 
                                                          
1Though contemporary realists are not dismissive of these thinkers, there exists considerable discrepancy 
between the amount of ink spilled on Williams’s and Geuss’s thought vis-à-vis Shklar’s, Berlin’s and 
Hampshire’s.   
2I focus predominantly on Walzer’s account, but the term standard DH thesis encompasses several expositions 
of DH (i.e. de Wijze, 1994; de Wijze and Goodwin, 2009; Stocker, 1990; Gowans, 2001). The paper builds on 
a suggestion that I have explored in more detailed elsewhere – that, despite disagreements over the scope and 
precise characterization of DH, DH theorists take for granted Walzer’s ‘static’ conceptualisation of DH (see 
Tillyris, 2015). This is a controversial point, which I cannot defend in detail here, and which might well be 
disputed by proponents of the standard DH thesis. However, if we can accept the suggestion that the Walzerian 
DH thesis – by virtue of its static nature and abstract foundations – constitutes a brand of the moralism realists 
reject, my argument casts new light on what is peculiar to realism, and on what a more positive realist account 
of public ethics and of DH might entail. 
3Whilst realist accounts do not converge towards a single positive alternative to moralism, they are, however, 
animated by a consistent rejection of moralism – the conviction that political theorising should be 
conceptualized in a bottom-up fashion; that, it should be sensitive to the distinctiveness and grubbiness of 
2 
discrepancy between Berlin’s, Shklar’s and Hampshire’s thought and the standard DH thesis enables us to 
pursue a particular direction in which a more positive realist approach to public ethics and integrity might be 
developed – an approach which we might term Heraclitian realism and which follows from their idiosyncratic 
and innovative account of the place of conflict in human life. But I also want to issue a warning to 
contemporary realists: rescuing realism from illusions, to use Philp’s (2012) words, requires its modern heirs 
to avoid the temptation of treating the standard DH thesis as a subset of realism. Whilst a detailed appraisal of 
critiques of realism is beyond this essay’s remit, my argument does furnish these: though sympathetic to realist 
thought, the essay casts doubt on the internal coherence and realism of contemporary realist positions which 
uncritically invoke that thesis and inherit fragments of its moralism4. 
 
Before proceeding any further, I should emphasise that I do not wish to suggest that the idea of DH – the 
tension between the dictates of individual and public morality, and, the corresponding need to practice certain 
moral vices for political reasons – has no purchase or place in realist thought. Rather, my argument builds on 
what I have termed elsewhere the dynamic account of DH (see Tillyris, 2016a, 2016b, 2017), and suggests 
that: i) from a realist perspective, the DH problem is perennial, far more enduring than the standard, Walzerian 
thesis allows, and, indeed, constitutive of public integrity; and ii) such a problem does not just constitute 
inescapable, systematic a feature of high-end politics, formal institutional frameworks and settings, but it also 








                                                          
politics, to people’s actual dispositions, desires, and sentiments, and the conflicts and idiosyncrasies of human 
life (Williams, 1973; 1986; 2002; Geuss, 2005; 2008; 2015; Galston, 2010; Hall, 2015; Voinea, 2016; Rossi 
& Sleat, 2014; Philp, 2007; Horton, 2017; Tillyris, 2016a; 2016b; 2018). This general point of convergence, 
which constitutes my starting point, is exactly what the DH thesis cannot appreciate, and on which the more 
affirmative realist approach outlined here rests. 
4 This is not to say that realists consistently uphold the DH thesis. The incoherence of such realist accounts 
stems from the fact that they inherit certain features from that thesis which are antithetical to the commitments 
they espouse – their alleged attentiveness to the messiness of politics. Further, I do not wish to argue that all 
realists subscribe to the DH thesis. My argument unearths the existence of a neglected divide in the scholarship 
of realism: between contemporary realists who invoke the Walzerian thesis and inherit fragments of its 
moralism (i.e. Philp and Sigwart), and thinkers identified with the realist tradition, who articulate a more 
realistic account of DH (i.e. Berlin, Hampshire, and Shklar; see also Bellamy, 2010; Hollis, 1982). 
3 
Political Realism and the DH Thesis: Two Sides of the same Coin? 
 
The tendency to view the standard DH thesis as a subset of realism is unsurprising5. Both positions seem to 
take issue with moralism and urge philosophers to ‘get real’. To be sure, realists advance several objections to 
moralism (see Rossi & Sleat, 2014; Hall, 2015; Bell, 2010; Horton, 2017), and it is not my intention to offer a 
comprehensive review of all of these objections here. Rather, I wish to focus on two particular objections 
which go at the heart of the question of what a realist public ethic might entail, and which are seemingly echoed 
by the DH thesis. 
 
In order to flesh these objections out, I will begin by drawing on Moliere’s The Misanthrope. In Moliere’s 
play, Alceste, the main protagonist, reveals his disdain for the moral degradation of mankind: ‘There’s nothing 
to be seen in court or town which aggravates my spleen … mankind has grown so base’ (1982: 20). Alceste, 
Shklar (1984: 194) writes, embraces some vision of ‘transformed humanity’; he imagines that ‘a better version 
of mankind did or will exist’ and rages at the wretched creatures by which he is surrounded. His contempt is 
fuelled by society’s failure to live up to his moral aspirations. 
 
Moliere’s play, to use Shklar’s (1984: 227) words, is ‘for and about us’, democratic citizens – especially if we 
consider the ubiquity of racial, religious, class-based and ideological hatred; the plethora of ‘isms’ and 
‘phobias’ which permeate our everyday language and which denote disassociation from, and contempt of, a 
particular group. It is this sort of antipathies that have received attention by some realists (Shklar, 1984; 
Hampshire, 1989; 2000; Horton, 2011). For realists, fragmentation and pluralism are ineliminable features of 
liberal democratic communities (Philp, 2007; Sigwart, 2012; Bell, 2010; Horton, 2010; Galston, 2010). The 
demand issued by contemporary philosophers that people should positively respect others and their views, 
revise their conceptions of the good to be ‘inclusive,’ misconstrues the realities of politics – our fragmented, 
pluralistic world, and our experience of pluralism and fragmentation. Pluralistic communities, in short, are 
characterized by diversity, difference, and conflict, and are likely to generate attitudes of mutual contempt 
(Shklar, 1984: 78; Hampshire, 2000: 34 – 35; Horton, 2011: 292). 
 
But Moliere’s play is not just relevant to us because it suggests that conflict and contempt are inescapable 
aspects of our experience. It also poses the question of how should we – democratic citizens – coexist and 
interact with one another given pluralism and our experience of it. For moralists like Alceste, that question 
welcomes a pithy answer: ‘We should condemn … artificial intercourse … Let the heart speak and let our 
sentiments not mask themselves in silly compliments’ (Moliere, 1982: 18 – 19). A good citizen, Alceste 
contends, should be indistinguishable from a morally good man; unconditional truthfulness, upholding your 
                                                          
5 This is also fuelled by their alleged Machiavellian lineage (see Coady, 2008; Parrish, 2007; Philp, 2007). 
Exploring this point is beyond the remit of the essay; I challenge the affinity between the DH and Machiavelli’s 
thought elsewhere (see Tillyris, 2015). 
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principles “though the heavens fall”, is a moral and public virtue. Public integrity is akin to moral integrity, 
the innocence and moral consistency of the saint. Alceste’s moralism is ridiculed by his realist friend, Philinte, 
who shares Alceste’s contempt for the way individuals lead their lives but rejects his conviction that humanity 
can fit into a tidy scheme of morality and/or justice and his belief that public and moral integrity are of a piece. 
‘Like you’, Philinte notes, ‘I see’ numerous ‘unhandsome deeds’. But ‘in certain cases, it would be it would 
be uncouth, and … absurd to speak of the naked truth … It’s often best to veil one’s true emotions. Wouldn’t 
the social fabric come undone, if we were frank with everyone?’ (Moliere, 1982: 19). Unconditional 
truthfulness, upholding your principles come what may, Philinte suggests, might be definitive of moral 
integrity and innocence, but constitute an affront to political experience and responsibility. Innocence, 
regardless of how morally admirable it might be, is incompatible with public integrity and is not a public virtue. 
It is a vice. 
 
Hence the second realist objection to moralism I wish to highlight: ‘political morality is not the same as 
individual morality’ (Galston, 2010: 392; Philp, 2007: 34, 38–9, 89–94). Making sense of public ethics entails 
approaching politics as a practice with its own peculiar demands: ‘the appropriate standards of evaluation arise 
from within politics, not from an abstract moral standpoint’ (Galston, 2010: 387 – 388; see also Philp, 2007; 
Hampshire, 1989; Williams, 1978; 2002; Sigwart, 2012; Bell, 2010; Horton, 2017; Tillyris, 2016a; 2016b; 
2017). Put simply, public virtue and integrity are incompatible with moral integrity; a virtuous public life is 
intertwined with the occasional practice of certain moral vices. The willingness to compromise and betray 
one’s substantive or positive aspirations and principles, to hypocritically veil one’s contempt for others who 
espouse different aspirations and principles are not unfortunate by-products of social interaction but necessary 
conditions for a modicum of order and civility: a bulwark against descent into a state of cruelty and chaos. As 
Shklar writes: 
 
The democracy of everyday life … is based on the pretence that we must speak to each other 
as if social standings were a matter of indifference in our views of each other. That is, of 
course, not true. Not all of us are even convinced that all men are entitled to a certain 
minimum of social respect … But most of us act as if we really did believe it, and that is 
what counts. Our manners are just as artificial as those … in Moliere’s play … Should our 
public conduct really mirror our private, inner selves? … [O]ne might well argue that liberal 
democracy cannot afford public sincerity. Honesties that humiliate and a stiff-neck refusal 
to compromise would ruin democratic civility in a society in which people have many 
serious differences in belief and interest (Shklar, 1984: 77 – 78; see also Hampshire, 2001; 
Berlin, 1990).   
 
It is these two aforementioned commitments/objections to moralism which appear to be echoed by the standard 
DH thesis. First, like realism that thesis challenges the moralist proclivity to displace pluralism and conflict 
and our experience of these phenomena; it suggests that the value-monist vision of harmony permeating 
5 
Kantian and Utilitarian theories is unsatisfactorily idealistic and presents us with a psychologically 
impoverished self (Walzer, 1973; Philp, 2007). The DH thesis, Stephen de Wijze explains, seeks to ‘capture 
the existence of genuine moral conflict’, ‘the in-commensurability of cherished values’ and to provide ‘a more 
plausible characterization of our moral reality’ (2009: 309 – 317). It seeks to restore ‘balance in the Anglo-
American philosophical tradition’, by placing our emotions ‘at the centre of moral discourse’ (de Wijze, 2005: 
458). Secondly, the DH thesis does not just question ‘the coherence and harmony of the moral universe’, but 
also ‘the relative ease or difficulty-or impossibility-of living a moral life’ in politics (Walzer, 1973: 174). That 
thesis seemingly echoes the disquieting Philintean-realist suggestion that individual and public morality 
conflict – that public integrity is not akin to the innocence and consistency of the saint. Despite the ‘virtues of 
the “absolutist” position’, Walzer writes, ‘we would not want to be governed by men who consistently adopted 
[it]’ (1973: 162). For, public personas – specifically, professional politicians – might have to compromise their 
principles, and employ or tolerate immoral actions for important political reasons; they might, for instance, 
have to practice the moral vices of lying and cruelty to ‘measure up to the duties of ... [their] office’ (Walzer, 
1973: 161; 162 – 164). Hence, Sigwart surmises, the DH thesis ‘captures the ambivalent consequences of … 
[the realist] understanding of political ethics’ – that, ‘the fundamental moral paradoxes and contradictions … 
of political ethics … cannot be dissolved’ (2013: 409; 431). That thesis, Bell similarly emphasises, echoes the 
realist insights on ‘the [morally] complex character of political action’ (2010: 108). 
 
Given the standard DH thesis’ emphasis on pluralism, fragmentation and conflict, its commitment to taking 
our emotions and moral messiness of politics seriously, it seems striking that its contemporary proponents have 
said nothing about contempt. Even more striking is that standard DH theorists ‘barely explored’ the issue of 
‘democratic agency’: the question of whether the prospect of having to get DH and practice certain vices might 
not just directly confront politicians but also democratic citizens in their seemingly more mundane, everyday 
lives (Parrish, 2007: 17). This is not to say that proponents of the DH thesis are altogether oblivious to the 
dirty hands of democratic citizens. However, the words ‘directly’ and ‘everyday’ are highlighted here, as DH 
scholars have mostly approached that issue by pondering over the ethical problems pertaining to the nature of 
political representation and democratic politics – i.e. by considering how, in the context of representative 
democracies, democratic citizens might be complicit in and thereby indirectly tainted by their politicians’ dirt, 
or how democratic citizens might have to directly get DH by having to punish their political representatives 
who got their hands dirty by acting on citizens’ behalf (see Thompson, 1989; Walzer, 1973; de Wijze, 2018). 
What is thus missing from contemporary DH analyses, is a careful consideration of how the problem of dirty 
hands, the requirement to directly practice certain moral vices in public life, might occur outside of high-end 
politics, formal institutional frameworks and settings. Differently put, notwithstanding the recognition that 
high politics, deals and decisions, might be reserved for the few6, proponents of the standard DH thesis are yet 
to entertain Philinte’s disquieting recognition that the sustainment of a community characterized by pluralism, 
                                                          
6Elaborating on the distinctiveness of professional politics is beyond this essay’s scope, but see Walzer (1973) 
and Bellamy (2010). 
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conflict, and contempt, might require its citizens to practice certain moral vices in their quotidian, seemingly 
prosaic interactions for the sake of securing and conserving certain fundamental political goods, as much as it 
requires their political representatives. This, however, should not surprise us. 
 
In what follows, I shall uncover a neglected divide in the way realism and the standard DH thesis conceive of 
politics and of what is possible both in theory and practice. I will argue that the DH thesis and realism provide 
us with two contrasting pictures of public ethics and of public integrity. To be clear, I do not merely wish to 
suggest that the DH thesis and realism put forward two distinct but equally plausible accounts of political 
reality. Rather, I wish to illustrate that, that thesis is a veiled brand of the moralism realists reject. It 
misconceives our morally messy, fragmented landscape; as such, it also fails to grapple with our experience 
of such fragmentation, the complex demands of public ethics and the nature of public integrity. Unlike other 
DH and realist scholars (e.g. de Wijze, 1994; Stocker, 1990; Gowans, 2001; Sigwart, 2012; Coady, 2008), I 
am not primarily concerned about whether Walzer’s thesis is too narrow – whether it erroneously restricts DH 
to professional politicians. To merely take issue with the narrowness of Walzer’s thesis and to thereby seek to 
extend its insights to democratic citizens, is to side-line the question of whether that thesis is satisfactory in 
the first place – whether it is sensitive to the moral grubbiness of politics, as conceived by realists. Whilst the 
DH thesis is thought to capture the recognition that acting immorally, practicing certain moral vices, is an 
inescapable, systematic feature of public life, it fails to do so: it conceives of the need to practice the vices in 
‘episodic’ terms, and construes the rift between individual and public morality or between moral and public 
integrity as an abnormality – an abnormality sustained by an innocent vision of societal harmony. Simply put, 
the DH thesis cannot account for the ubiquitous, diurnal and ordinary dirt of democratic citizens – our everyday 
compromises, and betrayals – because it misconstrues pluralism and displaces conflict. Nor, can that thesis 
capture the need to frequently veil our antipathies for the sake of preserving the important political goods of 
order and civility; for, its failure to adequately grapple with the perpetuity of conflict and pluralism entails that 
it lacks the conceptual resources to capture our antipathies in the first place. It is to the DH thesis’ episodic 
conception of the rift between public and individual morality I first turn. 
 
On the Rift between Public and Individual Morality 
 
In his original essay, Political Action: The problem of Dirty Hands, Walzer suggests that the DH problem – 
the rift between individual and public morality and the corresponding need to act immorally or practice certain 
moral vices in public life – is a ‘central’ feature of politics: it ‘arises not merely as an occasional crisis … but 
systematically and frequently’ (1973: 162). These remarks are often contrasted with Walzer’s more recent 
allusions to DH in Just and Unjust Wars and Emergency Ethics, where DH is subsumed under the heading of 
‘supreme emergency scenarios’ and is, as argued, more restrictive in scope (Bell, 2010; Coady, 2008; 2014). 
Supreme emergencies, as the term suggests, are exceptionally rare; ‘dirty hands’, Walzer argues, ‘aren’t 
permissible (or necessary) when anything less than the ongoingness of the community is at stake’ (2004: 46). 
7 
And, the ‘ongoingness of the political community’ is thought to be at stake only in extreme cases, which mostly 
occur amidst armed warfare7. 
 
The claim that Walzer’s interpretation of DH has shifted casts doubt on whether there exists a canonical 
account of DH in the first place. Yet, pace Coady and Bell, I contend that, whilst the language Walzer employs 
in his original essay gives the impression that the need to practice certain vices in public life is neither sporadic 
nor rare – that the rift between individual morality/moral integrity and public morality/integrity is perpetual, 
insurmountable and irresolvable – the way in which he conceives of DH suggests otherwise; the supposedly 
revised understanding of DH as an extreme, rare scenario is consistent throughout Walzer’s work. 
 
In his seminal essay, Walzer departs by imagining a ‘moral man’, a man of moral integrity – an ex-ante 
innocent individual who has ‘principles and a history of adherence to those principles’ –,who enters politics 
seeking ‘to do good only by doing good’ (1973: 166; 165). Yet, this ex-ante morally good and innocent public 
agent is soon confronted with a stark scenario – the prospect of having to practice the vices or compromise 
one’s principles. Hence the DH problem: 
 
A particular act of government may be exactly the right thing in utilitarian terms and yet 
leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong. The innocent man, afterwards, is no 
longer innocent. If … he chooses … the "absolutist" side of ... [the] dilemma, he not only 
fails to do the right thing (in utilitarian terms), he may also fail to measure up to the duties 
of his office. (Walzer, 1973: 161; my emphasis). 
 
The public persona Walzer envisions is impaled on the horns of a momentous conflict – between the demands 
of public morality (which are thought to be Utilitarian) and the demands of individual morality (which are 
thought to be Kantian) 8. The ensuing loss of moral goodness and innocence, the result of one’s dirty acts, is 
portrayed as a traumatic experience: ‘if he is the good man I am imagining him to be’, Walzer writes, ‘he will 
feel guilt’ (1973: 166). ‘The issue of regret’ which is thought to accompany the exhibition of immorality, Philp 
explains, ‘is important’: whilst ‘what needs to be done should be done’, regret helps us to acknowledge the 
moral ‘costs of doing so imposes on those who decide and undertake what needs to be done’9 (2007: 92 – 93). 
Hence the DH thesis’ commitment to taking moral conflict and our experience of it seriously: its alleged 
sensitivity to public agents’ ‘inwardness’ is intertwined with its acknowledgement of our fragmented, 
                                                          
7 This should alarm us: Walzer’s claim suggests that there exists a large chasm between ‘normal’, everyday 
politics and war. 
8 This way of casting DH is also apparent in Walzer’s more recent work: in supreme emergency scenarios, he 
writes, ‘a certain kind of utilitarianism re-imposes itself’ and clashes with ‘a rights normality’ (2004a: 40). 
9DH theorists’ fetishism with ‘regret’ (Philp, 2007), ‘anguish’ (Walzer, 1973), ‘guilt’ (Stocker, 1990; Gowans, 
2001), ‘tragic-remorse’ (de Wijze, 2005), I explain, is a symptom of their ‘episodic’ conception of conflict. 
8 
pluralistic landscape – the anti-Kantian and anti-Utilitarian recognition that the conflict between individual 
and public morality is not perfectly resolvable. This, however, is not the whole story: 
 
It is not the case that when [the politician] does bad in order to do good he surrenders himself 
forever to the demon of politics. He commits a determinate crime, and he must pay a 
determinate penalty. When he has done so, his hands will be clean again (Walzer, 1973: 
178; my emphasis). 
 
The trouble here is not just that, despite Walzer’s apparent recognition that ‘we can get our hands dirty in 
private life’ (1973: 174), the presumption and language of innocence and moral goodness suggest that the 
practice of the vices is necessary only within the domain of professional politics – that outside high politics, 
harmony between moral and public integrity are possible. Rather, the presumption and language of ex-ante 
and ex-post innocence and moral goodness suggest that the default position of Walzer’s thesis, even when one 
is concerned with professional politics, is one of harmony between public and individual morality or between 
public and moral integrity. 
 
Walzer’s allusions to ‘innocence lost’, ‘guilt’, and ‘innocence regained’, popular amongst DH theorists (see 
de Wijze, 2005, 2012; Gowans, 2001), are familiar: they are echoed in the story of The Fall whereby innocence 
and goodness are lost through the act of eating of the forbidden fruit, mourned, and desperately sought to be 
recovered. A similar story, Berlin writes, is told by Plato who envisions a distant, happy past men where were 
‘spherical in shape but were then divided’; and, ‘ever since each hemisphere’ is trying ‘to find its appropriate 
mate’ and become, once again, ‘rounded and perfect’ (Berlin, 1990b: 21 – 23). A version of that story is also 
told by Marx and Lenin, who conceive of history as a drama ridden with ‘terrible tribulations’ and ‘collisions’ 
which nonetheless culminates into ‘a happy ending’: ‘a conflict-free society’ in which ‘men are rational, 
cooperative, virtuous’ and which marks the birth of true history (Berlin, 1990b: 44; see also Hampshire, 1989: 
179; Williams, 1981: 72).  To be sure, these stories differ greatly with one another in content. Yet, they all 
follow a hopeful narrative which is definitive of moralism: 
 
Once upon a time there was a perfect state, then some enormous disaster took place … the 
pristine unity is shivered, and the rest of human history is a continuous attempt to piece 
together fragments in order to restore serenity, so that the perfect state may be realized once 
again … our lives are conceived … as an agonized effort to piece together the broken 
fragments of the perfect whole with which the universe began and to which it may yet return 
(Berlin, 1990b: 23). 
 
What unites these stories is a clear, surgical pattern fuelled by the conviction that conflict is a deviation from 
what is thought to be normal, harmonious, and perfect a state: at time0 (t0) there exists a perfect, harmonious 
state; at time1 (t1) this harmony is shattered; and, at time 2 (t2) this broken unity is restored. Or, so it is thought. 
9 
It is this pattern which shapes the standard DH thesis’ conception of the rift between individual morality/moral 
integrity and public morality/political integrity. That thesis presupposes that at t0 moral and public integrity 
are in harmony; at t1, that harmony is disrupted; the morally innocent public agent, courtesy of some deeply 
unfortunate event, gets DH: moral and public integrity suddenly part ways, and the agent is compelled to 
violate his moral principles, practice the vices, and relinquish his moral innocence; and, finally, at t2, such 
harmony is re-established and the agent’s moral innocence is restored – the agent’s dirt is washed away via an 
honest public confession and certain purgative rituals, and the momentary gulf between moral and public 
integrity thereby closes10. 
 
The gap in the way in which the DH thesis conceives of the rift between moral and public integrity vis-à-vis 
the realist conception of it, should be apparent. That thesis seems closer to Alceste’s moralist ethos of 
innocence than Philinte’s realist ethos of experience. Unlike the latter – which suggests that harmony between 
moral and public integrity is impossible in theory and in practice – the DH thesis conceives of the rift between 
moral and public integrity in episodic terms: it assumes that moral and political integrity are (and should be) 
in harmony until a single, stark episode which requires acting immorally and practicing the vices is presented 
to the agent. Whilst that thesis acknowledges that in certain rare, deeply unfortunate cases, public agents should 
not exhibit the moral integrity and innocence of the saint, it presupposes that moral integrity and innocence 
need not be irretrievably lost in politics11. Nor, is it implausible to envision some sort of harmony between 
individual or political morality, or between moral and public integrity: Contra Berlin (1980: 50) and the 
Philintean ethos of experience, the DH thesis presumes that it is not the case that ‘one can save one’s soul’ and 
                                                          
10 Whilst the temporary gap between individual and public morality – with regard to the DH politician – closes, 
in Walzer’s account the dirt is “transferred” to democratic citizens, who should punish the politician but cannot 
do so ‘without getting’ their ‘hands dirty’, and who must somehow pay the price (1973: 180). Yet, this seems 
to bespeak of a certain romanticism of the ideal of innocence and the tendency to ignore that dirt and conflict 
are perpetual, and extend to citizens’ everyday interactions. 
11 I elaborate on the static nature of the DH thesis in the context of professional politics elsewhere (see Tillyris, 
2015). As I argue, standard DH theorists’ conviction that DH politicians should publically reveal their dirt to 
regain their innocence via cathartic punishment ignores the existence of a second-order DH dilemma: either to 
publically reveal one’s DH to regain one’s innocence, at the cost of political ostracism; or, conceal one’s dirt 
and fulfil one’s political commitment, at the cost of piling vice on top of vice. The conflict between morality 
and politics does not evaporate, as DH theorists assume. Indeed, Walzer’s conviction that the good politician 
should not publically ‘pretend that his hands are clean’ – a prelude to the politician’s punishment, and to the 
restoration of harmony between individual and public morality – renders his account paradoxically censorious 
of the vice of hypocrisy: it displaces the recognition that good politicians should pay attention to the strategic 




lead a life of moral integrity and innocence ‘or serve a state’ and lead a life of political integrity and experience; 
under normal conditions and, at least in theory, public integrity should not be that dissimilar to, or incompatible 
with, moral integrity, or the innocence, and consistency of the saint. In Walzer’s words: ‘we don’t want to be 
ruled by men who have lost their souls. A politician with dirty hands needs a soul and it is best for all of us if 
he has some hope of personal salvation, however that is conceived’ (1973: 177 – 178). The DH thesis, de Wijze 
explains, ‘explores … how good people can be morally compromised’. It ponders how ‘good and moral 
persons … engaged in realpolitik maintain their moral integrity’; ‘what happens to a politician’s moral 
goodness and integrity when the only way to ensure … stability … requires the use of immoral means’ (de 
Wijze, 2012: 199; 190). Walzer’s account, Sigwart writes, ‘raises the question of how to preserve moral 
integrity on the slippery slope of power politics’ (2013: 432). 
 
What lurks in the background of the DH thesis, then, is account of public ethics which takes moral integrity, 
and innocence, as integral to or, at least, compatible with, public morality and integrity – an account which 
paradoxically entails that DH and the practice of the vices are (or should be) scarce, momentary anomalies, 
not – as realists maintain – persistent, and inherent features of political life and public integrity. As such, the 
DH thesis sits uneasily with the realist point that there exists an insurmountable rift between public and 
individual morality, each of which is characterised by their own distinct, incongruent standards of excellence 
and conceptions of integrity – that, the virtues of innocence, unconditional honesty, upholding one’s principles 
and commitments, though definitive of moral integrity, are not public virtues and are incompatible with public 
integrity. Notwithstanding its emphasis on intractable, irreducible moral conflict then, – its endeavour to 
question ‘the coherence and harmony of the moral universe’ and acknowledge the ‘impossibility of living a 
moral life’ in politics – the DH thesis appears to discount some deep implications of intractability and 
irreducibility: it misconstrues the rift between individual and public morality, and seems to constitute a variant 
of the Kantianism and Utilitarian vision of harmony it seeks to evade. 
 
That the standard DH thesis conceptualises the rift between public and individual morality in ‘episodic’ terms 
– that it restricts DH, the necessity to practice the vices, only in certain rare, stark, and momentary episodes – 
is glimpsed by Shklar: 
 
The politics of great gesture … still appeal to those engaged intellectuals who like to think 
of “dirty hands” as a peculiarly shaking, personal and spectacular crisis. This is a fantasy 
quite appropriate in the imaginary world, in which these people see themselves in full 
technicolor (1984: 243). 
 
This remark unearths an important antinomy in Shklar’s thought – the distinction between what is ‘real’ and 
what is ‘imagined’; between what is an accurate depiction of political reality and an abstract caricature of 
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public life12 (Forrester, 2012). That antinomy captures a crucial symptom and further indication of the DH 
thesis’ ‘episodic’ flavour: despite its alleged sensitivity to our emotions, that thesis presents us with a 
psychologically impoverished, abstract, and apolitical self – fragments of which also permeate Philp’s and 
Sigwart’s realist accounts. ‘Where the dirty hands’ theorists go wrong’, is by erroneously ‘believing that their 
“stark choices” are appropriate to the real world’ of politics (Forrester, 2012: 9). Again, the point here is that 
the DH thesis seems oblivious to the ‘uncertainty’, everyday dirt democratic politics requires – the necessity 
and ubiquity of hypocrisy, and of quotidian compromises and betrayals (Shklar, 1984: 243). The 
conceptualization of the rift between individual and public morality, of the need to compromise one’s 
principles and practice the vices, as an abnormality is inescapably accompanied by an unpalatable over-
dramatization of politics and of the conflicts politics engenders. Pace Philp (and proponents of the DH thesis), 
this need not deny that decent public agents should experience such conflicts or acknowledge the moral costs 
associated with practicing the vices. Rather, the point here is that because of its presumed rarity, the rift 
between moral and public integrity is portrayed in too ‘glamorous’ a manner and is painted in abstracto of 
what realists perceive as the context of real politics – the everyday, grubby interactions that take place between 
different public agents. For, if one accepts that the practice of the vices is an essential aspect of public morality 
and integrity, to think of a public agent as a tormented figure, haunted by guilt, would be melodramatic, to say 
the least. If the practice of the vices is systematic, not abnormal, a feature of public life, it is more plausible to 
suggest that the dirtier the public agent’s hands get, the more blasé towards his dirt he becomes. And, if one 
takes the rift between individual and public integrity seriously – the recognition moral integrity and innocence 
are not states or qualities which can be temporarily lost in politics but states or qualities which are incompatible 
with a virtuous public life in toto (Hampshire, 1989: 161 – 183) –, one has no reason to expect this melodrama 
in the first place. Indeed, as Walzer suggests, that would be the reaction of an ‘imagined’, morally innocent 
individual, not of a politically grounded, experienced agent, who takes the grubbiness of politics seriously. 
Experience, the sine qua non of public virtue, involves ‘the expectation of unavoidable squalor’ – the 
recognition one’s ‘usual choice will be the lesser of two or more evils’ (Hampshire, 1989: 170; see also Berlin, 
1981: 66). 
 
The abstract, apolitical and sociologically detached self which lurks in the background of the DH thesis – a 
by-product of its ‘episodic’ flavour and flight from political reality – is also evident in the way in which that 
thesis typically frames and discusses DH scenarios: it focuses on a single, ‘heroic figure’ who must make an 
enormous sacrifice (Shklar, 1984: 243). Again, the trouble here is that the picture of this lonely, ex-ante 
innocent individual who is faced with (what is thought to be) a momentary, stark choice diverts our attention 
away from real politics – the relationships between different individuals. The heroic individual envisioned by 
the DH thesis and the episodic conception of the rift between individual and public morality is conceived in 
abstracto of the messy context in which real agents operate – a context ridden with antagonistic, mutually 
                                                          
12 That the DH thesis abstracts from political reality also emerges from Shue’s (2009) critique of one the 
examples Walzer uses – the Ticking Bomb Scenario. 
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antipathetic agents who espouse different substantive or positive values and principles and who must, if they 
are to co-exist and co-operate in a relatively civil manner, occasionally get their hands dirty, by trimming their 
moral aspirations and hypocritically veiling their antipathies. 
 
The standard DH thesis and realism thus depart from fundamentally different premises, at the core of which 
lie not just contrasting pictures of public morality and integrity but also radically different pictures of politics 
and community. It is tempting to suggest alternatively that no conception of community whatsoever is to be 
found in the DH thesis. This might, perhaps, explain why the notion of community hardly features in 
contemporary DH accounts. But whilst the public agent the DH thesis presents us with floats above the real 
political context, that agent, I contend, does operate within a particular conception of political community – 
one which has received little attention by DH theorists and contemporary realists: an innocent, apolitical vision 
of societal harmony. It is this vision which sustains DH theorists’ idealistic, ‘episodic’ conceptualization of 
the rift between individual and public morality. 
 
On Community, Pluralism and Conflict 
 
Let me begin by elaborating the moralist narrative of temporary disaster which sets the terms in which the DH 
thesis’ episodic conception of the rift between individual and public morality is couched. That narrative puts 
forward an image of perfection under the aegis of unity and completeness – an a priori faith in the conceptual 
possibility, normality and attractiveness of harmony – which is traced to Plato’s Republic and which a large 
strand of philosophical thought in general and the post-Rawlsian scholarship on ideal/non-ideal theory in 
particular has, almost unquestioningly, inherited (Berlin, 1990a; Hampshire, 1983; 1989; 2000). At the core of 
this narrative lies the seductive assumption of value-monism – the very assumption the DH thesis allegedly 
challenges but which, I will argue, collapses into. Value-monism entails that moral conflicts are pathologies – 
chimeras or mathematical puzzles that can and should be overcome. Monism, Berlin writes, postulates that ‘all 
truly good things are linked to one another in a single, perfect whole; or, at the very least cannot be 
incompatible’ and ‘that the realization of the pattern formed by them is the one true end of all rational activity, 
both public and private’ (Berlin, 1969: x). Monism, Hampshire writes, presupposes that there exists ‘a common 
basis’ behind and ‘an ultimate harmony among moral claims’ (1983: 118). 
 
Note that monism does not just entail an image of harmony at the level of the individual; it does not merely 
entail that the demands and virtues of individual and public morality can be harmonized in a coherent, allegedly 
perfect whole. Rather, monism also entails an image of harmony at the level of the polis. It presents us with a 
vision of what is thought to be the perfect, ideal community: ‘a society which lives in pure harmony’, in which 
its members, despite their apparent differences agree on certain neat, substantive values, principles and 
interests and can thereby ‘live in peace’, ‘love one another’ and lead a life devoid of contempt towards one 
another (Berlin, 1990b: 20). As Berlin’s remark suggests, it is this vision of harmony at the level of the polis 
which fortifies the vision of harmony at the level of the individual. For, in a harmonious community – a society 
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in which public personas agree with respect to their positive moral aspirations, principles, aspirations and 
interests – the necessity to compromise one’s principles or hypocritically conceal one’s disdain need not arise 
in the first place. Neither contempt and antagonisms nor the practice of certain vices are admitted into 
harmonious, and what is thought to be perfect, healthy, and normal a society (Shklar, 1965; Hampshire, 2000). 
Regardless of whether one’s initial focus lies on the level of the individual or of the polis, then, the belief in 
the possibility of formulating a set of shared substantive or positive values and principles – be they cast as 
universal principles of justice and/or morality, couched in abstract rationality, or as society-wide principles of 
justice and/or morality, couched in our allegedly common, communal understandings – casts away the 
possibility of insurmountable conflict within the polis – between different individuals – and within the 
individual – between moral and public integrity. 
 
This recognition unearths where the precise problem with the DH thesis lies. Recall that Walzer casts the rift 
between individual and public morality as a conflict between Kantian and Utilitarian principles. That thesis 
does not question the overall validity and premises of such theories. It takes these for granted. Whilst that 
thesis purportedly mends some of the insights of Kantianism and Utilitarianism – by pointing to the 
(temporary) rift between individual and public morality – its discussion of that rift proceeds by embracing the 
allegedly universal, substantive principles and values propounded by these theories13 (Tillyris, 2016a). As 
such, the DH thesis inherits what for realists constitutes a crucial problem with such theories – a problem forms 
an essential aspect of their abstract moralism and value-monism. For, such theories do not merely displace 
conflict and fragmentation at the level of the individual – between the dictates and virtues of individual and 
public morality – as the DH thesis suggests. They also displace conflict and fragmentation at the level of the 
polis: they turn a blind eye to the recognition that there exists a plurality of conflicting, incommensurable and 
antagonistic ways of life, each with its own distinct conception of the good and justice, its own distinct set of 
substantive moral principles, values and aspirations. As Hampshire writes: 
 
                                                          
13One might object that this is an uncharitable critique of Walzer’s account. For, Walzer’s paper on DH was 
published in 1973 and ponders the possibility of moral conflict – a possibility which was an anathema to 
Kantians and Utilitarians. As such, the cost of failing to question the underlying premises of Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism – the vision of societal harmony and consensus on certain substantive moral principles – is, one 
might argue, inevitable, and given Walzer’s aims, necessary. Though I cannot address this objection in detail 
here, I wish to highlight two problems with it. First, pluralist critics of Kantianism and Utilitarianism – i.e. 
Williams, Berlin, Hampshire, and Shklar – sought to defend the idea of irresolvable moral conflict by rejecting 
the aforementioned philosophical traditions altogether, by taking deep pluralism and the perpetuity of conflict 
at the level of the individual and of the polis a lot more seriously. Secondly, the vision of societal harmony 
and agreement on certain substantive moral principles is, as I argue, a recurrent theme in Walzer’s thought: it 
underpins his conception of community in Spheres of Justice, On Negative Politics, and Just and Unjust Wars. 
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This picture of a possible harmony … is carried through the Christian centuries and persists 
in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and it persists in contemporary liberalism also. 
Whatever the contingent differences between us arising from our personal history – from 
our memories and imagination – the king in his castle and the peasant in his hovel are one, 
in their common humanity, in virtue of the overriding superiority of rational moral principles 
that king and peasant may both implicitly recognize (2000: 22). 
 
Or, as he notes elsewhere: 
 
Whether it is Aristotelian, Kantian, Humean, or utilitarian, … philosophy can do harm when 
it implies that there ought to be, and can be, fundamental agreement on, or … a convergence 
in, moral ideals – the harm is that the reality of conflict, both within individuals and within 
societies, is disguised by the myth of humanity as a consistent moral unit across time and 
space. There is a false blandness in the myth, an aversion from reality (Hampshire, 1983: 
155) 
 
By virtue of its Kantian and Utilitarian premises, Walzer’s thesis can, at best, only account for a plurality of 
conflicting values and principles. It lacks the conceptual resources to account for a plurality of different, 
conflicting and antagonistic ways of life, each with its own substantive moral values and principles, each with 
its own distinct conception of such values and principles which cannot be brought into harmony nor cashed 
out into a single currency evaluation. Hence, it is not just that the DH thesis postulates that the conflict between 
individual and public morality is ephemeral, ultimately resolvable and thereby collapses into the moralist 
vision it allegedly challenges – the Kantian and Utilitarian image of harmony at the level of the individual. 
Rather, its ‘episodic’ conception of that conflict is sustained by a vision of harmony at the level of the polis. 
DH theorists’ tendency to conceive of a lonely individual in abstracto of real, conflict-ridden political context 
should not thus strike us as odd. That tendency is symptomatic of a larger problem: the DH thesis’ conviction 
that a single individual, not a plurality of individuals, inhabits the world or a political community. 
 
This aversion from reality – the misconception of pluralism and the consequent reduction of the plural, diverse 
and antagonistic ways of life which compose a polis into a single, perfect and harmonious whole – is not just 
displayed by DH accounts which cast the rift between individual and public morality in Utilitarian and Kantian 
terms. What is at stake here is not just whether conceptualising DH as a conflict between Kantian and 
Utilitarian principles suffices, but, rather, whether universal or society-wide agreement on a set of substantive 
principles, values, and aspirations whatever these may be is plausible. This conviction also seems to permeate 
the more contemporary expositions of DH articulated by de Wijze (1994) and Stocker (1990) which inherit 
Walzer’s’ episodic conception of DH, but cast the problem as a stark, momentary, dramatic conflict between 
two ‘impossible oughts’ (see Tillyris, 2016a; 2017). That these expositions of DH presuppose the existence of 
substantive principles and values to which all agents should ascend, does not just follow from the fact that they 
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subsume and do not reject Walzer’s specific formulation – that, they do not take issue with the allegedly 
universal, sociologically detached nature of Kantian and Utilitarian principles (Tillyris, 2016a: 165). Rather, 
the moralism of such accounts can be also gleaned from their uncritical reliance on the word ‘ought’, which 
frequently appears in modern philosophical discussions but which, to use Hampshire’s words, constitutes ‘a 
residue of Kant’s doctrine’ and the Enlightenment: its ‘recognised moral use’ denotes the existence of ‘a 
universal principle’ (Hampshire, 1982: 13). The blindness of modern DH expositions to the universalist 
connotations associated with ‘ought’ and the philosophical tradition of which that word is part – in addition to 
their tendency to build on Walzer’s ‘episodic’ account –, suggests that they too espouse a shallow conception 
of pluralism: like Walzer’s account, these expositions can account for one-person conflicts – a plurality of 
conflicting values and principles – but lack the conceptual resources to capture the existence of a plurality of 
different, and antagonistic ways of life, each with its own distinct, incompatible conception of these values and 
principles. 
 
This misconception of pluralism and reduction of the diverse and antagonistic ways of life which compose a 
polis into a single, perfect, and harmonious whole – a misconception which descends from Walzer’s account 
upon contemporary expositions of DH – is also apparent in Walzer’s Spheres of Justice which is rarely 
discussed in conjunction with his DH account14. Walzer’s Spheres of Justice, like his DH thesis, appears to 
echo certain realist commitments – an anti-Platonic commitment against abstraction; an attentiveness to our 
pluralistic, fragmented and messy moral landscape15 (for a ‘realist’ take on Spheres of Justice, see Sangiovanni, 
                                                          
14 Note that Spheres of Justice is not the only work of Walzer which misconstrues pluralism and displaces 
conflict. In his critique of Shklar’s liberalism of fear, Walzer argues that politics should not be merely seen as 
a bulwark against the summum malum – i.e. chaos, cruelty, and injustice –, but as protecting something more 
positive and substantive: ‘when we defend the bulwarks we are usually defending something more than our 
lives; we are defending our way of life’ (Walzer, 1996: 18). This idealistic vision of societal harmony and 
agreement on certain substantive principles of justice or morality, also underpins Walzer’s conception of the 
state in Just and Unjust Wars. For, states, according to Walzer, constitute a formed political association, an 
organic social contract, and should not just ensure individual security; rather, they should also protect a 
common cultural life, made their citizens over centuries of interaction (see Walzer, 2006: 53 – 58; see also 
Lazar, 2013: 5380 and Luban, 1980). 
15Indeed, Walzer distances himself from the Kantian and Utilitarian universalism and conception of abstract 
rationality permeating his DH thesis. Contra Plato and the Enlightenment, Walzer emphasizes that he does not 
seek to ‘sketch a utopia located nowhere’, ‘a philosophical ideal applicable everywhere’ or achieve ‘great 
distance from … [our] social world’. We should, Walzer notes, avoid giving into ‘the first impulse’ of 
philosophers since Plato, and ‘search for some underlying unity’ (1985: 4 – 6). Yet, notwithstanding Walzer’s 
shift from humanity to community, the vision of harmony under the aegis of agreement on certain substantive 
values and principles remains: Walzer supplants universal, substantive principles grounded on abstract 
rationality, with society-wide substantive principles, grounded on shared communal understandings. 
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2008). Yet, like his DH thesis, Walzer’s account of justice misconstrues pluralism, fragmentation and conflict 
and collapses into the moralism and monism realists reject. Whilst Walzer is clear that our cosmos features a 
plurality of goods which are interpreted differently across different times and places and which feed into a 
plurality of substantive principles of justice, he paradoxically suggests that within a domestic community – a 
liberal democratic community, no less – the search for common, substantive principles of justice is not futile; 
these principles can be extracted from ‘our shared understandings of social goods’ (Walzer, 1985: xiv). ‘The 
political community’, Walzer emphasizes, is ‘the appropriate setting’ for grounding such principles. For, ‘it is 
probably the closest we can come to a world of common meanings. Language, history and culture come 
together ... to produce a collective consciousness’ a set of ‘sharing sensibilities and intuitions’ (Walzer, 1985: 
28). What one encounters here, is the shallow conception of pluralism which permeates the DH thesis: 
Walzer’s emphasis on shared understandings of goods and substantive or positive principles, his assertion that 
‘mutual respect’ constitutes one of the ‘deep strengths’ of his account (Walzer, 1985: 321), entail that his 
conception of community can, at best, only accommodate a plurality of different and conflicting substantive 
principles of justice. It cannot accommodate a plurality of different, antagonistic and deeply hostile ways of 
life, each with its own conception of the same good and substantive principle of justice16. This recognition also 
emerges from Shklar’s The Work of Michael Walzer, in which she ponders: ‘What are those “shared 
understandings” on which everything is based? … [W]e may speak the same language, but that is no guarantee 
of sharing. … Far from sharing a common understanding, the citizens of a modern state are culturally disparate 
and often deeply hostile to one another’ (1998: 384 – 385). Or, as she writes in The Faces of Injustice: 
 
These intimations of shared meaning … are never checked against actual opinions … To 
confuse a common culture with a harmony of political interests amounts to little but a sleight 
of hand. What cultures share … is language, which makes it possible for us to express, 
among other things, our … contempt for each other  (1990: 115). 
 
 The “core” of Shklar’s disagreement with Walzer’s account in particular and ‘communitarian thought’ in 
general, Shefali Mizra explains, ‘resided in its misty-eyed romanticism about the nature of community’ (Mizra, 
2016: 80) – her contention that ‘harmonious accounts’ of community fail to grapple with ‘the evidence of 
direct experience and the irreducible conflicts of social opinion’ (Shklar, 1967: 280; see also Hess, 
2014).Shklar’s retort to the vision of societal harmony permeating Walzer’s thought thus captures an important 
aspect of her critique of moralism: that vision is an innocent fairy-tale. What is worth highlighting here, is that 
a version of this vision also persists in Philp’s account which, despite its emphasis on societal conflict, 
postulates that a perfect, harmonious liberal state, though practically unrealisable, is conceptually plausible 
                                                          
16 That Walzer’s account entails a moralistic, harmonious conception of community is noted by Ronald 
Dworkin; Walzer’s vision, Dworkin observes, is ‘relaxed’ and ‘agreeable’ – it ‘promises a society at peace 
with its own traditions, without … tensions’ … ‘Citizens live together in harmony’ (1983: 1 – 2). 
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(Philp, 2007: 111). But, that vision, to use Berlin’s words, presents us with ‘a world’ which is ‘beyond our 
ken’ (1990a: 13). To proceed by embracing that vision is to erroneously begin from a point external to the 
world we inhabit – it is to distort or bend reality into conformity with one’s own creative will. ‘We must’, 
Berlin emphasizes, ‘fall back on the ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human 
knowledge’. And ‘these certainly give us no warrant for supposing’ that ‘a harmony of true values is 
somewhere to be found’ (1969: 168 – 169). ‘When uncorrupted by [moralist] theory’, Hampshire adds, we 
identify ‘a multiplicity of [conflicting] moral claims’ (1978: 42). We identify that ‘different men and different 
social groups recognize rather different moral necessities in the same essential areas of moral concern’ 
(Hampshire, 1983: 94). Our world scatters numerous differences and conflicts before us: different and 
competing ways of life, different and competing substantive ideals and interests, different and competing 
conceptions of these ideals and interests. What is at stake here is neither a matter of mere practical ‘feasibility’ 
or ‘constraint’ nor a question of consistency per se. It is not that we can begin from the premise that a 
harmonious society – a society united under the aegis of certain substantive principles and values – is, in theory 
plausible, but our circumstances are such that we cannot practically realize that society or consistently act on 
the basis of such principles and values [pace ‘realists’ such as Philp (2007), and ideal/non-ideal theorists such 
as Valentini (2012), Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012)]. Rather, the question is, in part, what should be seen as 
plausible even in theory, even under the most ideal circumstances. In this sense, realism is not, pace Philp, 
‘committed to bringing political theory out of the sun’, by drawing our attention to ‘the grubby exigencies of 
the political cave’ (Philp, 2012: 2; 18). Rather, it suggests that to begin from the sun is to set off from the 
wrong premises altogether. For, ‘no rules that we could invent would be better’, Shklar emphasises, ‘because 
we remain … too diverse to be fit into a single normative scheme’ (1990: 27). The realist critique, is, in short, 
partly levelled against the moralist conviction that a harmonious society is conceptually plausible in the first 
place – the quest to first formulate certain shared, substantive principles, values, aspirations (whatever these 
might be) and then merely seek to realise these in politics. 
 
What is troublesome with the vision of societal harmony which fuels moralist projects, is that it ‘ascribes 
psychological and intellectual qualities to us that we simply do not possess’ (Shklar, 1990: 27). Otherwise put, 
that vision rests, either implicitly or explicitly, on a problematic, ahistorical picture of the faculty of reason, or 
consciousness. The idea here is that reason or consciousness has a convergent property: it enables those who 
possess and can exercise that capacity to converge towards and reach agreement on the common good or on 
certain substantive moral principles, values and aspirations. Yet, there is nowhere evidence that common sense 
or the exercise of reason tends naturally to converge in the way moralists presuppose (Berlin, 1980; Shklar, 
1984; 1990; Hampshire, 1983; 1993b; 2000). Put differently, that the moralist vision of societal serenity is 
implausible is defended by appeal to a simple motto which reflects the realities of the political cave and which 
captures one of the key sources of conflict within the polis and of our mutual antipathies: ‘“all determination 
is negation”’ (Hampshire, 2000: 34). Historically, Hampshire argues, groups and individuals have tended to 
define themselves – their traditions and substantive conceptions of morality and/or justice – in oppositional 
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terms: not merely in terms of who they are and what they espouse but also in terms of who they are not and 
what they reject: 
 
Some forms of fundamentalism … define themselves as a principled rejection of secular, 
liberal and permissive moralities … The essence of liberal morality is the rejection of any 
final and exclusive authority, natural and supernatural, and of the accompanying compulsion 
and censorship. In this context, freedom itself is ... cherished, as a negative notion: no walls 
of dogma, no unquestionable rules from priests and politicians; the future is to be an open 
field for discovery … The liberal’s adversary is disgusted … by this negativity, by the 
openness and emptiness, by the looseness of undirected living. The ensuing conflict is dark 
and bitter (Hampshire, 2000: 34 – 35). 
 
This idea is also gestured by Berlin who writes: ‘One chooses classical civilisation rather than the Theban 
desert, Rome and not Jerusalem, whatever the priests may say, because such is one's nature, and - he is no 
existentialist or romantic individualist avant la parole - because it is that of men in general, at all times, 
everywhere’ (Berlin, 1980: 75). As long as individuals are affiliated with conflicting traditions, lead different 
lives and have different life stories, experiences, memories, and imaginations neither conflict nor antagonism 
and contempt, should be expected to evaporate in theory and in practice. ‘Conflict is perpetual’, Hampshire 
reminds us: ‘why, then, should we be deceived?’ (2000: 51). 
 
Thus, the standard DH thesis – by virtue of its shallow conception of pluralism and conflict – does not just 
displace the recognition that society is a battlefield of different, antagonistic ways of life. The displacement of 
that recognition constitutes, in essence, the displacement of what realists perceive politics to be. The DH thesis 
cannot grapple with the morally messy context in which public personas operate or with what is distinctive of 
realist thought: that, a satisfactory account of public ethics entails approaching politics as a practice with its 
own demands and standards of excellence – demands and standards of excellence which emerge from within 
politics. By virtue of its moralistic, sanitized conception of community, the DH thesis is incapable of 
adequately entertaining how precious and precarious order, stability, and civility are, and how effortful the 
maintenance of a shared public space is. Nor can it account for the recognition that the burdens of maintaining 
such a space are also directly incurred by democratic citizens – the agents who inhabit it and accrue some of 
its benefits: a protection from a perpetual ‘war of all of all against all’, a life that is ‘nasty, brutish and short’, 
and the capacity to compete for, pursue and realize some of their substantive values, principles and aspirations 
(Hampshire, 2001; Berlin, 1990a; Shklar, 1984). Differently put, the DH thesis displaces what Williams terms 
the first political question – the question which constitutes the point from which Moliere’s play sets off: how 
to secure a modicum of ‘order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation’ amidst a chaotic 
plurality of antagonistic ways of life (Williams, 2002: 3). That question and the Philintean-realist answer to it 
– that, the maintenance of a shared public space amid deep societal conflict opens an insurmountable, perpetual 
rift between the dictates of individual and public morality and integrity; that, sustaining a modicum of order 
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and civility renders the need to get DH, and the practice of certain vices systematic, enduring, and essential an 
aspect of public ethics and public integrity – cannot be entertained by the DH thesis17. For, these are superseded 
by a more morally demanding but unsatisfactorily idealistic, value-monist vision of harmony at the level of 
the polis. 
 
The Distinctiveness of (Heraclitian) Realism 
 
In Realism without Illusions, Philp acknowledges that one of the risks realists face is losing their way. My 
discussion thus far has unearthed and explored one of the ways in which that might and often does happen. 
The recognition that the DH thesis constitutes a disguised version of moralism, entails that the tendency of 
some contemporary realists (Philp included) to uncritically appeal to that thesis and borrow some of its features 
is problematic; at best, it might sow confusion over the distinctiveness of realist thought; at worst, it casts 
doubt over the internal coherence and realism of their accounts. 
 
The recognition that the DH thesis is a brand of moralism also casts doubt on the moralist proclivity to elide 
realism with the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. Indeed, Berlin’s, Shklar’s, and Hampshire’s neglected insights 
help us to clarify and strengthen a point which is often gestured en passant in the literature on realism (see 
Geuss, 2008: 2; 21; 2005: 223; 2015) but which is insufficiently appreciated by realists who draw on the DH 
thesis: unlike non-ideal theories, realism does not merely question the practicability of the vision propounded 
by moralism/ideal theories; it does not just emphasize that conflict, our mutual antipathies, and the need to 
practice certain vices are prima facie perpetual features of public life – difficult, perhaps impossible, to remove 
in practice – but surmountable in theory. Contra the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, the realist charge is not 
methodological in nature per se: it is not a call for moralists to incorporate more empirical facts into their 
accounts and consider how these might affect the practical implementation of the normative vision they 
articulate. Rather, the nature of the realist charge is primarily conceptual: it entails the rejection of the very 
plausibility of the normative vision ideal/non-ideal theories articulate. And, it is upon the rejection of the 
innocent vision of societal harmony under the aegis of agreement on substantive principles (whatever these 
might be), that a more positive, realist vision of public ethics and DH is couched: the recognition that an 
adequate account of public ethics should approach politics as a distinctive practice with its own peculiar set of 
demands and standards of excellence – a practice which occurs amidst a chaos of conflicting, hostile ways of 
                                                          
17 This need not entail that citizens should always betray their aspirations or unconditionally tolerate others by 
masking their antipathies. Nor is this to suggest that order and security are unconditional goods. However, 
these ‘negative’ goods are of fundamental importance – securing these is a condition for pursuing other, more 
‘positive’ goods (Berlin, 1990a; Williams, 2002; Hampshire, 2001). My aim here is not to cast an all-
encompassing account of when public personas should practice the vices (a task which cannot be performed 
in abstracto of the circumstances with which a particular agent is confronted with), but to register a more 
modest point: the DH thesis displaces politics and public ethics.   
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life and which requires the capacity to often hypocritically veil one’s contempt and suspend one’s substantive 
values and principles in action.  
 
What I want to emphasize though, is that realism – as apprehended by Berlin, Hampshire and Shklar – also 
casts doubt on the moralist, value-monist conviction that harmony – at the level of the individual (between 
individual and public morality) and of the polis (between different public agents) – is desirable; or, in reverse, 
that conflict, our mutual antipathies and the need to practice certain vices are defects or diseases in public and 
individual life; deviations from the normal, perfect state of affairs. This recognition lies at the core of the 
specific brand of realism espoused by Berlin, Hampshire and Shklar – what we might term Heraclitian realism 
– and marks an important divergence in the way in which the heroes of this paper conceive of the place of 
conflict in human life vis-à-vis more mainstream realists such as Williams. This emerges most clearly in 
Hampshire’s review of Williams’s Moral Luck. Hampshire (1982) approves of Williams’s rejection of the 
Platonist picture which descends upon the Enlightenment: the value-monist picture of harmony under the aegis 
of certain shared substantive principles, and values, and welcomes his suggestion that conflicts are perpetual 
and irresolvable; that, abstract theory, the sovereignty of general principles, should be supplanted by theorising 
which is historical, contextual in nature; and, that morality has, in part, its sources in convention and custom. 
Yet, Hampshire laments, ‘Williams’ is ‘still more under the influence of Plato than of Heraclitus’. For, 
Williams does not go as far as to endorse the radical Heraclitian claim that ‘it is only an insoluble conflict 
between values which lends moral significance to existence, and that such conflicts, not an ideal moral 
consensus, constitute the essence … of our humanity’ (Hampshire, 1982: 13). The Heraclitian point is also 
elaborated in Morality and Conflict: 
 
Neither in a social order, nor in the experience of an individual is a state of conflict a sign of 
… defect, or a malfunctioning. It is not a deviation from the normal state of a city or of a 
nation, and it is not a deviation from the normal course of a person’s experience (Hampshire, 
2000: 40; my emphasis). 
 
Heraclitian realism is not just conceptually different from the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. Rather, it is 
opposed to the very terms and assumptions upon which that debate is set and conducted. Failure to agree on a 
substantive conception of justice and/or morality, even in ideal circumstances, is neither a mark of 
unreasonableness nor a testament to our burdened judgement as Rawls and his heirs suggest; it signals neither 
that something has gone ‘wrong’ (Rawls, 1996: 55), nor is it a testament to our irrationality, ‘indiscipline’ and 
‘stupidity’ – a deviation from what should be seen as the normal, perfect state of affairs (Plato, 1993: 444b). 
Rather, conflict and our mutual antipathies should be seen as normal, essential and, to an extent, desirable 
features of our lives (Shklar, 1984; Berlin, 1980; Hampshire, 2000). To envision a life devoid of conflict and 
contempt would be to envision a life that is lifeless and inhuman: ‘harmony and inner consensus come only 
with death, when human faces no longer express conflicts but are immobile, composed and at rest’ (Hampshire, 
1989: 189). Conflict is a necessary source of human vitality; the clashes and antipathies in the polis have a 
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‘life-giving’ quality’ (Hampshire, 1993a: 46). Indeed, to envision a life devoid of conflict would be to envision 
a life devoid of moral content. For, ‘morality has its sources in conflict’ (Hampshire, 1983: 152). Our capacity 
to find substantive moral meaning and worth in our lives, to pursue what we find meaningful and worthwhile, 
I highlighted earlier, is conditioned upon our distinctive pattern of experiences and memories and the rejection 
of what we find morally worthless and meaningless. Ways of life, with their own distinctive substantive 
principles of morality and/or justice do not just lead to conflict and contempt but are, in part, moulded through 
conflict and contempt.  
 
I should, at this point, emphasise two important issues. First, the core insight which animates the realist critique 
of moralism in general, and the Heraclitian account in particular – that, conflict at the level of city is perpetual 
and irresolvable; that, the search for common, substantive aspirations, and principles of morality or justice is 
futile – need not entail a cynical, amoralist ethos. Rather, the point is that the primary purpose of individual 
and common morality should be preventive or negative as opposed to aspirational or positive: it should be 
motivated by the summum malum as opposed to the summum bonum, the search of which is fruitless. Hence, 
rather than seeking to conceive of, and realise, certain common, substantive, yet abstract aspirations, ideals, 
and principles of justice or morality– aspirations, ideals, and principles which all rational individuals or 
members of a community are expected to ascend –, the primary business of morality is the prevention of 
concrete and ‘perennial evils’, injustices, and immoralities – such as cruelty, fear, and humiliation, – evils 
which should be prevented ‘almost at all costs’ (Hampshire, 2001: xi – xii; 43; Shklar, 1984; 1989; 1990; 
Berlin, 1990). Secondly, to suggest that agreement on a common substantive morality is impossible, is not to 
discount substantive morality as such. Rather, that seeking to fashion abstract, allegedly common positive 
ideals, principles, and aspirations, realism directs our attention to the ‘particularity of the particular case’ – the 
role of conventions, traditions, and moral explanations which entail that we should expect an irreducible 
plurality of different and conflicting positive ideals, principles, and aspirations, as well as a plurality of 
different and conflicting conceptions of such positive ideals, principles, and aspirations. What emerges from 
this insight, is a point which has received little attention in contemporary treatments of realism and which 
might be insufficiently entertained if one places excessive emphasis on, or interprets in superficial a manner, 
what realists term ‘the ethics first’ or ‘applied ethics’ approach18: on this account, moralism in general, and the 
ideal/non-deal theory debate in particular, do not just, by virtue of their emphasis on the conceptual plausibility 
of harmony, displace politics. They also displace (individual) morality:  
 
Morality and conflict are inseparable: conflict between different and admirable ways of life 
and between different defensible moral ideals, conflict of obligations, conflict between 
essential, but incompatible, interests … [T]he subject matter of morality is misrepresented 
                                                          
18 One might argue that Geuss’s (2005; 2008) realism to which such phraseology is traced is oblivious to ethics 
altogether. This issue is beyond this essay’s remit but see Honig and Stears (2011).  
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and disappears from view when a moralist concludes with a picture of … ultimate harmony 
… (Hampshire, 1983: 1).  
 
I have highlighted some of the particular problems with the moralist view of self in my earlier treatment of the 
DH thesis, but the point worth noting here is that because moralism displaces conflict, it is also bound to 
present us with tasteless caricatures of real persons; it is bound to displace rich plurality of different ways of 
life which inhabit our political landscape and the substantive, particular values, principles and aspirations 
which these ways of life espouse – values, interests and aspirations which are antithetical to those to which the 
moralist espouses and to which he presumes the exercise of reason can enable us to converge. As Hampshire 
writes: 
 
Liberals ... believe that there is no great moral significance to be attached to the accident of 
our place of birth and of our inheritance ... [The opponents of liberalism], whom liberals 
sometimes call fanatics, see destiny, intention, or design in their inheritance, and from their 
ancestry they infer a … specific set of duties, and a clear plan for their lives. Perhaps this 
most fundamental of all oppositions in politics comes from contrasting attitudes to time, 
historical time. When, famously, “Remember 1689” is chalked on a wall in Belfast by a 
Roman Catholic calling to mind William III’s Protestant Settlements, it would most certainly 
be useless to respond: “Be fair and reasonable: forget the injustices of the past, as you see 
them, because the past cannot now be repaired: it is more fair and reasonable to start from 
now …” The response comes back: “You are asking us to forget who we are … We should 
cease to exist as a community if we thought only of the future and of what you call 
reasonableness” (1996: 159) 
 
The innocent belief that, in theory, rational agents can agree on certain society-wide, substantive moral 
principles, values and interests entails that moralism is bound to put forward an abstract conception of persons 
which obscures features which are central to our particular identity, history and substantive conception of 
morality: our distinctive pattern of experiences and emotions; our attachment with certain groups and rejection 
and contempt of others; our particular understanding of our life and its moral purpose; our particular 
substantive values, principles and aspirations (Hampshire, 2001: 25 – 26; Shklar, 1984: 78; Berlin, 1980). The 
moralist failure to account for what we reject and loathe entails a failure to capture who we are and what we 
morally stand for. 
 
What is peculiar to Heraclitian realism, then, is that it does not merely suggest that we should lower our 
political and moral expectations as non-ideal theorists dictate but, rather, that our entire system of moral and 
political expectations is confused and should be recalibrated. This does not just concern the way we appraise 
our societal circumstances and lives qua moral agents. It also speaks directly to the manner we should appraise 
our lives qua citizens – the way we conceive of public virtue and integrity. Pace Sigwart (2013: 432), it is not 
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the case that realism ‘raises the question of how to preserve moral integrity’ in politics. That remark is infused 
with a Walzerian, moralist flavour which, at the very least, obscures the realist point that Sigwart seeks to 
vindicate: that ‘the fundamental paradoxes and contradictions of public ethics cannot be dissolved’ (2013: 
413). As suggested following Berlin, Hampshire, and Shklar, the rift between moral and public integrity is not 
just irresolvable and perpetual but also normal and essential an aspect of humanity. That ‘ends equally ultimate, 
equally sacred, may contradict each other’, Berlin reminds us, is ‘part of the normal human situation’: tragic 
conflict is not ‘the result of abnormality or error’, or – DH theorists take note – something that occurs ‘merely 
in exceptional circumstances’ (1980: 74 – 75; see also Berlin 1969: 169).  
 
To repeat, public integrity is not ‘a block of marble’, and is not akin to moral integrity, the innocence and 
rigidity of the saint (Hampshire, 1993). Rather, it is inescapably and naturally intertwined with fragmentation, 
conflicting desires and demands – the capacity to frequently one’s hands dirty, by practicing certain vices in 
public life for the sake of securing and preserving the paramount goods of civility and order. The ability to 
compromise and betray some of our substantive aspirations in action, to dissimulate and hypocritically veil 
our contempt for others who espouse different views, though problematic from the perspective of moral 
integrity, need not be unworthy in toto; for, it forms part and parcel of public integrity, and constitutes an 
essential lubricant of public affairs. Unlike the Walzerian, anguish-riven innocent public agent, a person of 
experience – the embodiment of Hampshire’s, Berlin’s and Shklar’s realist ethos – does not gaze at the future 
with the single-minded hope of and belief in final harmony, either in the soul or the polis, but is prepared to 
‘live with contradictions, unresolvable conflicts’ (Shklar, 1984: 249). The innocent quest for harmony entails 
shutting one’s eyes to the nuances and moral grubbiness of politics, without abolishing them. At best, that 
quest might find manifestation in an Alcestian eagerness to ‘resolve’ such conflicts once-and-for-all, by 
seeking a ‘solitary place’ to avoid contact with humankind (Moliere, 2000: 114). At worst, it might find 
expression in a zealous, uncontaminated and corrosive candour or an explicitly violent, Robespierrian will to 
impose one’s substantive principles come what may, and reduce the rest of us into ‘a Procrustean bed of some 
rigid dogma’ (Berlin, 1997: 77). The quest for harmony and salvation is not conducive to good citizenship or 
public integrity. At best, it might prompt exodus from public life. At worst, it might jeopardize the maintenance 
of a shared public space and the goods politics should shelter: a modicum of stability, order and civility. This 
is a point those immersed into the ideal/non-ideal theory debate should pay attention to. The pursuit of harmony 
under the aegis of agreement on certain substantive principles, values and aspirations that preoccupies that 
debate is not just futile. It might have disastrous moral and political implications if applied into practice. ‘Our 
experiences’, Shklar reminds us, ‘are too various … to be fit into general rules … and any attempt to impose 
them tends to backfire. Far from reducing our cruelties, rules simply redirect and formalise our ferocity’ (1990: 
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